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All great economists produce seminal contributions and provide their students and 
colleagues with brilliant insights; Jagdish Bhagwati has certainly done so.  But he has 
done much more.  Through his wit and energy he has communicated those insights to the 
public and wielded our best science to improve trade policy making.  In this note we 
address the question in which his unique blend of academic and policy work has been 
most valuable in the last 15 years: whether preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are a 
stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization (MTL).   Given that all WTO 
members except Mongolia are now members of a PTA and yet most are also non-
members of most PTAs this question has arguably become the most important one in 
trade policy.   Bhagwati first launched the warning in 1991 and challenged trade 
economists to tackle it.  His work has inspired a voluminous theoretical literature as well 
as recent evidence that suggests there is indeed a clash between preferential and 
multilateral liberalization. 
In his seminal contribution Viner (1950) shows that trade liberalization through 
PTAs  lowers a member’s welfare if it causes trade diversion.  The first surge of research 
into PTAs followed with important insights from distinguished economists such as 
Johnson, Meade, Lipsey and others.  Bhagwati (1971) also contributed to the static 
analysis of PTAs, showing that to rule out welfare improvements in the presence of a 
trade-diverting customs union the import elasticity at home must be zero and the 
elasticity of supply from the partners must be infinite.  A point that has since become 
familiar to trade economists.   
Bhagwati (1968) stands as a precursor to his interest and influence in the policy 
issues of the day.   According to the Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati conjecture LDCs 
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could minimize the cost of industrialization through PTAs among themselves.  This is 
formally proved by Bhagwati and Krishna (1997) using the insight from Kemp-Wan 
augmented with an instrument to deal with the extra objective of industrialization.  This 
suggests that perhaps the original conjecture benefited from the insights of the seminal 
work of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963).1 
The second wave of PTAs in the 90’s generated another surge of research and 
debate in which Bhagwati has been a key protagonist.  The key question that arose was 
not the static effects of PTAs on its members but whether PTAs would be  a “building 
block” or a “stumbling block” to worldwide MTL as Bhagwati (1991) so aptly 
recognized and put it.2 That this is the central issue is obvious today given that over 141 
PTAs are in force and many others are under negotiation or discussion.  But we should 
recall that by the start of 1990 there were only 25 PTAs in force and that the earlier wave 
of regionalism in the 60’s had failed.3  Bhagwati (1993) argued there were several 
differences in the new wave, such as the US “conversion” to regionalism, and correctly 
predicted that it would endure unlike the first one .4  
                                                 
1 They show that in the presence of a domestic distortion the deployment of an additional instrument 
restores the optimality of free trade.  Similarly, in Bhagwati and Krishna (1997) the additional instrument 
re-establishes the Pareto superiority of a type of trade policy (the customs union)  in the presence of a non-
economic objective.   
2 Some of the analysis focused on the static effects with several authors arguing against the concerns with 
trade diversion since PTAs  were expected to occur among “natural trading partners” where diversion was 
less likely.  Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1996) strongly contested this point showing 
that members could incur a large welfare cost from PTAs precisely when they were “natural partners” as 
defined by high volumes of trade--the criteria used in Wonnacot and Lutz (1989) and Summers (1991).  
Krishna (2003) concludes that there is no empirical support for the natural trading partners’ hypothesis for 
the US. 
3 The figures were calculated from WTO secretariat data in Crawford and Fiorentino (2005).  Bhagwati 
(1991) was based on his Johnson lectures given in 1990. 
4 The US frustration with the European Community’s opposition to a new multilateral trade round in 1982 
changed the US’s traditional opposition to PTAs, which it started to pursue as an additional form of 
liberalization.  The objective of some proponents of PTAs in the US was to use them “to bring other trading 
partners to the table”.  However, as Bhagwati (1991a) points out there were others, such as Ambassador 
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In addition to challenging trade theorists to address this issue Bhagwati also 
provided a valuable conceptualization of it.  Bhagwati (1993) frames the issue as the 
“dynamic time-path” question.  The time path of liberalization can be divided into two 
alternatives.  In the first, the time-path of world trade liberalization through 
discriminatory agreements (PTAs) and non-discriminatory ones (via multilateral trade 
negotiations) are independent.  In this case PTA’s can be a building block to worldwide 
free trade if their time-path is one of continuous expansion until all countries are 
eventually part of a single agreement.   Baldwin (1995) provides a model in which the 
expansion of PTAs increases the benefits of further non-members to join suggesting that 
PTAs are a building block.  However, he assumes free entry into PTAs thus ignoring the 
objections to entry from existing members.  The second alternative is that the time-path 
of PTAs and multilateral negotiations are not independent.  In this case we ask how PTAs 
affect the incentives to pursue MTL, i.e.  if they are “friends” or “foes”.  Most of the 
theoretical literature has focused on this latter question. 
Not only did Bhagwati introduce key concepts that have now been used in a vast 
literature, he also provided preliminary arguments that fuelled some of the formal 
analysis.   Bhagwati (1993) notes that PTAs are a “balance of  trade-creating and trade-
protecting forces” and so it is possible that those who benefit from the protection 
generated by it will oppose further expansion.   Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that 
when producers form lobbies the PTAs most likely to arise are the trade-diverting.    
Krishna (1998) arrives at a similar conclusion in a different setup and argues that these 
PTAs can reduce the incentive for multilateral free trade because the export rents they 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brock who was the US trade representative under Reagan, who viewed PTAs as a distinct path to 
multilateral liberalization and not necessarily as a tactic to force others to negotiation in the GATT.   
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generate disappear when countries liberalize multilaterally, and so the producers that 
benefit from those rents oppose MTL, i.e.   the “trade protecting” force at work.   
Bhagwati (1994) argued that if a country is a hegemon it may maximize its payoff by 
pursuing a sequence of PTAs with individual countries smaller than itself, which would 
allow it to more effectively use its bargaining power than a simultaneous bargain.  
Sequential vs.  simultaneous trade policy bargaining by a hegemon is the approach that 
Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2004) pursue to show that PTAs may be a stumbling block 
or a building block. 
Several other authors have provided interesting insights into the interaction of  
PTAs and MTL.  Here are two examples.  Levy (1997) models how a PTA may lead the 
median voter to reject multilateral free trade even though he would have accepted it if the 
PTA had not been available.  Bagwell and Staiger (1998) show that, in a repeated game, 
PTAs are a stumbling block if countries are very patient and a building block otherwise.5 
Given the second best nature of the question it is not surprising that both outcomes are 
possible and more generally that the issue will not be settled through theory alone. 
Although Bhagwati (1993) notes that “it is hard to imagine that the arbitrary 
groupings of countries that seek PTAs are dependent on economic arguments as their key 
determinants” and that “Often politics seems to drive these choices” virtually all formal 
analysis of the time-path question was confined to pure trade models.  Limão (2002) is an 
exception.  He provides a model where the main motive for a country to provide 
preferences is to pay for cooperation in a non-trade issue that is under the control of its 
                                                 
5 For a survey of other important contributions see Winters (1999).  A different strand of the literature 
started by Krugman (1991) analyzes the welfare path for exogenously expanding trading blocs.  Panagariya 
(2000) provides a broader review of the regionalism literature.   
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partner.  This captures the numerous unilateral preference programs where the US and the 
EU provide market access and in exchange require their partners to comply with 
conditions on intellectual property, environment, labor standards, drugs or terrorism.   By 
modeling the interaction with MTL, Limão shows that such PTAs can cause a stumbling 
block to MTL for the relatively larger countries since they have an incentive  to maintain 
a high preference margin to exchange for cooperation in non-trade issues.  A notable 
point is that even agreements with countries that are small from a trade perspective can 
affect the MTL of large countries.  This greatly expands the set of agreements that were 
thought to affect MTL since in most previous research MTL is affected only if the PTAs 
changed trade volumes and prices within the PTA. 
Despite the growing importance of PTAs and the ambiguous results from the 
theoretical research until recently there was no systematic evidence of their causal effect 
on MTL.  In fact most of the theoretical predictions generated were extremely difficult to 
test econometrically for two reasons.  First, the initial research that identifies MTL with 
free trade effectively focuses on whether a PTA changes the probability of a multilateral 
round.  This is a fine theoretical approach, which arose perhaps out of the experience with 
stalled negotiations with the Uruguay Round.  However, it generated, or perhaps 
consolidated, the view among many trade economists that “Empirically, it would be 
difficult to infer the impact of regional agreements on the pursuit of multilateral free 
trade, since the multilateral agreements of GATT are themselves so infrequent” (p.  335) 
as Feenstra concludes in his recent graduate textbook.   
It is also important to note that the effect of PTAs on the probability of a round 
cannot by itself answer whether they promote or slow down MTL because, given a round, 
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the degree of liberalization may vary because of PTAs.  Perhaps recognizing this last 
point several authors focus instead on deriving directly the level of the multilateral tariff 
with and without PTAs.  The difficulty with testing the latter (and also the former) is that 
we never observe the counterfactual, e.g.  if a country (or set of countries) has PTAs 
during a particular round it is impossible to observe how much liberalization it would 
have undertaken in the absence of those PTAs. 
The evidence that was initially put forth did suggest there was a correlation 
between PTAs and some countries' unilateral  trade liberalization (as opposed to their 
multilaterally negotiated protection).  Panagariya (1999) notes that Mexico, Mercosur and 
Israel raised some of their external tariffs after entering PTAs.  However, it is hard to 
establish causality based on timing alone.  In the case of Mexico for example the Peso 
crisis coincided with NAFTA.  Another alternative is to compare aggregate liberalization 
across countries.  Foroutan (1998) finds lower average MFN tariffs for Latin American 
countries with PTAs after the Uruguay Round but says that no causality can be drawn 
from such a correlation because those countries were moving away from import 
substitution during the 90's, which implied considerable unilateral liberalization 
independently of any effects from PTAs.  This issue of causation is partially addressed by 
Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti (2004) who estimate that the Argentine unilateral 
tariffs were lower in industries where the value of imports from Mercosur to value added 
in Argentina was highest.  A large fraction of the applied tariffs of Latin American 
countries, which are used in the work above, are set below their multilaterally bound 
tariffs, and should therefore be viewed as unilateral tariffs.  Moreover, neither paper 
 7
models MTL empirically in the context of a trade round so, even if we set causation 
issues aside, there is no systematic evidence that PTAs lead to more MTL.   
Given the points above the most productive route is not to try to explain the 
probability of rounds or aggregate MTL of a country over time but rather to pursue 
detailed econometric studies using product level data for individual countries, 
particularly, as Bhagwati (1993) also stresses, the large ones since they have the largest 
potential impact on non-members.  In this setting what counterfactual is the most 
reasonable in answering how PTAs affect a country’s own MTL? Limão (forthcoming) 
argues that if PTAs affect MTL that effect is strongest on PTA goods, i.e.  the subset that 
a country imports under PTAs, and thus proposes estimating the direct effect of the PTAs 
on a country's MTL by using non-PTA goods as the counterfactual for the outcome in the 
absence of PTAs.6 This is a prediction derived directly from Limão (2002) and its 
extension in Karacaovali and Limão (2005).  It is also supported by anecdotal evidence 
such as the fear of developing countries that MFN liberalization of countries that provide 
them with preferential treatment will erode those preferences and how it is focused on the 
specific set of products that they export.7 
Article XXIV, under which several PTAs are authorized in the GATT/WTO, 
forbids increases in MFN protection after PTAs.8 However, this is easy to circumvent by 
                                                 
6 This raises the question of whether the goods that are chosen to receive preferences are not random, which 
is an issue that the author addresses in detail both through various controls and instrumental variables. 
7 The possibility that preference erosion would reduce MFN liberalization was actually noted long ago; 
According to Johnson (1967, p.  166) it was a concern voiced by opponents of the generalized system of 
preferences when it was originally proposed. 
8 Note however, that the preferences under the Enabling Clause have a stronger requirement that they "shall 
not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a 
most-favoured-nation basis." Therefore the findings in Limão (forthcoming) and Karacaovali and Limão 
(2005) that the US and EU preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences  caused an 
impediment to their MFN reductions is a direct violation of that clause. 
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simply implementing those increases in the form of smaller reductions during the MTL 
round after the PTA takes place.  Therefore Limão (forthcoming) examines the Uruguay 
Round and econometrically establishes a causal relation from PTAs to MTL.   He finds 
that the US cuts in MFN tariffs for PTA products were on average only about one half of 
the reduction for similar products that did not receive preferences.  Thus he argues that 
the US MFN tariffs on its PTA goods--nearly 90% of all goods in the sample--would 
have been cut by twice as much in the absence of its PTAs.  Karacaovali and Limão 
(2005) find similar results for the EU.   
It is also important to note two other points about the stumbling block effect 
found for the US and the EU.  First, it is estimated to be considerably stronger than that 
of tariff reciprocity,  which the authors also model empirically.  That is if other countries 
wanted the US and EU MTL not to reflect the stumbling block effect they would have 
had to cut their own tariffs by substantially more than they did in the Uruguay Round.  
Second, the effect is present even when the preferences are granted to small countries.  
Limão and Olarreaga (2005) quantify the welfare effects  from this lost MTL and find 
they are non-negligible for countries that grant preferences, those receiving them and 
outsiders even if the switch occurs only for the preferences given to least developed 
countries by the US, EU and Japan.   
Trade economists successfully met the challenge launched by Bhagwati in 1991.  
We may even argue we have gone beyond it in providing evidence that PTAs are a 
stumbling block to MTL.  Although there are still open empirical questions--such as the 
effect of PTAs on non-tariff barriers (see Limão 2005)--there is good reason to fear that 
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PTAs are a stumbling block to MTL.  Our task is now to devise economically sound rules 
to protect MFN treatment and avoid any further clash of liberalizations.  It is also 
essential that we publicly advocate these and nobody does it better than Jagdish 
Bhagwati.   Therefore on his 70th birthday we celebrate his many academic contributions, 
thank him for his tireless role in exposing this “dracula to the light” and look forward to 
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